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RECENT DECISIONS
The principal case places Ohio with the great weight of authority in
recognizing the power of its courts to vacate divorce decrees after term
for fraud perpetrated in their procurement. Whether the courts of Ohio
will vacate divorce decrees for statutory reasons other than fraud3s is not
answered by the principal case. However, the rationale of the court, in
placing divorce decrees upon the same footing as other judgments, would
seem to sanction the application of other grounds set forth in the statute
for vacating judgments or divorce decrees.
BmnNARD R. HOLLANDER
NON-NAVIGABLE STREAMS - INTERFERENCE WITH DRAINAGE
- GOVERNMENT LIABILITY
The value of respondenes farming land which bordered on a non-
navigable tributary of the Mississippi River was gready depreciated by
subsurface flooding. Waters had been backed up behind a government
built dam to a permanent stage equal to the high-water level of the river.1
These waters invaded a large area of respondent's land at a level a few feet
below the surface and blocked both normal surface and subsurface drain-
age. The Court of Claims allowed respondent damages. The United States
appealed. Held, in a 5-4 decision, the damage is compensable because the
land was not in the bed of the river and to the extent of the destruction
there was a public "taking" of private property.2
Federal activities in navigation and flood control have been rapidly
increasing in the last two decades with the result that many problems have
arisen concerning landowners' interests which are adversely affected by
such projects.3 The common basic issue involved in these problems is the
"The common pleas court or the court of appeals may vacate or modify its own
final order, judgment or decree after the term at which it was made: 3. For
istake, neglect or omission of the clerk, or irregularity in obtaining a judgment or
order 5. For erroneous proceedings against an infant or person of unsound
mind, when the condition of such defendant does not appear in the record, nor the
error in the proceedings. 6. For the death of one of the parties before the judgment
in the action. 7. For unavoidable casualty or misfortune preventing the party from
prosecuting or defending. 8. For error in a judgment, shown by an infant within
twelve months after arriving at full age as prescribed in section 11603 10. When
such judgment or order was obtained, in whole or in a material part, by false testi-
mony on the part of the successful party, or any witness in his behalf, which ordi-
nary prudence could not have anticipated or guarded against, and the guilty party
has been convicted." Omio GEN. CODE § 11631.
'The dam was built as a part of a program to improve navigation on the Mississippi
River between Minneapolis and the mouth of the Missouri River under 46 STAT.
918, 927 (1930) and 49 STAT. 1028, 1034 (1935).
United States v. Kansas City Life Insurance Co., 339 U.S. 799, 70 Sup.Ct. 885
(1950).
" Fitts and Marquis, Liability of the Federal Government and its Agents for Inyuries
to Real Property Resulting from River Improvements, 16 TENN.L.Xxv. 801 (194"1).
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extent to which Congress may exert its power to control navigation in the
public interest.4
The power of Congress to improve navigation has long been held to
create a dominant servitude in the government upon the title of riparian
owners.5 However, small streams which are non-navigable have been
traditionally held not to be subject to this public servitude. In Uoted
States v. Cress recovery was allowed for damage to lands subjected to fre-
quent overflows from backed-up waters mainly because the land bounded
upon a non-navigable tributary of a navigable river. Certain recent de-
cisions have limited this rule by making non-navigibility depend upon
whether the stream may be made navigable by improvements involving
reasonable expenditures." A strong dissent in the principal case follows this
trend by advocating the overruling of the Cress case and by treating riparian
owners on navigable and non-navigable streams alike when either is af-
fected by governmental improvements in navigation.
It is a general rule that the dominant servitude extends to the entire
bed of a river;' this includes all those lands lying below the high-water
level."0 Any exercise of the power to inprove navigation within this
limitation does not subject the government to liability for compensation
since there is no "taking" of private property within the prohibition of the
Fifth Amendment.- Yet it is well settled that if the federal government
4 The power of the United States over navigable waters arises from the commerce
clause of the Constitution, Art. I, § 8, Cl. 3. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. (22 U.S.)
1 (1824)
Fitts v. Marquis, supra note 3, at 813.
"Rose Island Co. v. United States, 46 F. 2d 802 (1930), Wadsworth v. Smith, 11
Me. 278, 26 Am. Dec. 525 (1834); see United States v. Willow River Power Co.,
324 U. S. 499, 505-7, 65 Sup. Ct. 761, 765-6 (1945) Historically, the navigability
of a stream was determined as it was by Justice Field in The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall
(77 U.S.) 557 (1871) at 563, "Those rivers must be regarded as public navigable
rivers in law which are navigable in fact. And they are navigable in fact when they
are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways
for commerce " Accord, The Montello, 20 Wall. (87 U.S.) 430 (1874).
'243 U.S. 316, 37 Sup.Ct. 380 (1917)
'Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Atkinson, 313 U.S. 508, 61 Sup.Ct. 1050 (1941);
United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 61 Sup.C. 291
(1940) (reversing the District and Circuit Court of Appeals holdings that the New
River was non-navigable)
'United States v. Chicago, M.,St.P., & P.R. Co., 312 U.S. 592, 61 Sup.Ct. 772
(1941).
' Marret v. United States, 82 Ct.Cl. 1 (1936), cert. demed, 299 U.S. 545, 57 Sup.Ct.
113 (1936). Cf. United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 65
Sup.Ct. 761 (1945)
'In Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141, 21 Sup. Ct. 48 (1900), no compensation
under the Fifth Amendment was allowed where a pier erected by the United States
in a navigable river blocked a riparian owner's access. Cf. Greenleaf-Johnson Lum-
ber Co. v. Garrison, 237 U.S. 251, 35 Sup.Ct. 551 (1915).
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improves navigation without first condemning the land affected lying out-
side the bed of the stream, the owner may bring suit against the United
States in a proper case.12 If the court is satisfied that the damages sustained
amount to a "taking," recovery will be allowed.
The question as to what constitutes a "taking' by the governments
exercise of its power to improve navigation is one which cannot be answered
satisfactorily even after inspecting the results of the cases. Pumpelly v.
Green Bay Co.' 3 established the accepted rule that an actual invasion upon
lands by waters backed-up behind a dam is a "taking" within the purview of
the Constituion.:  The Cress case went so far as to hold that there was a
"taking" when lands were subjected only to frequent overflowings. 5 But,
on the other hand, prior to the principal case, the bulk of decisions have
been to the effect that there is no "taking" unless there is that actual invasion
of real estate by overflow waters.' 6 This property concept has developed
to the point in the federal courts that damages to drainage systems only,17
to power heads at mills," to boat landings,' 9 and to downstream farmlands
subjected to waters deflected from government levees, 0 have all been re-
"Courts reason that when private property is taken by the government in opposition
to the guarantee of the Fifth Amendment, an implied promise to pay arises which
can be sued upon under 28 U. S. C. § 1491 (4) (1950). See Comment, 50 YALE
L.J. 668 (1941).
'" 13 Wall. (80 U.S.) 166 (1871) (provision of Wisconsin Constitution involved,
but wording identical to that in Fifth Amendment).
"nited States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445, 23 Sup. Ct. 349 (1903); Jackson v. United
States, 31 Ct. Cl. 318 (1896); Merriam v. United States, 29 Ct. Cl. 250 (1894)
(demurrer by government, that a flooding of clamant's land created no cause of
action because it sounded in tort, overruled).
'For a similar holding, see Jacobs v. United States, 45 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1930).
Lands which were subject to overflow prior to the government's building a dam
were held to be "taken" when they were subjected to overflow more frequently
after the dam was erected.
"Northern Transportation Co. of Ohio v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635 (1878) (riparian
rights not involved); Mills v. United States, 46 Fed. 738 (S.D. Ga. 1891). The
court reviewed Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 13 Wall. (80 U.S.) 166 (1871), but
distinguished it on its facts. But cf. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 66 Sup.
Ct. 1062 (1946) (government airplanes descending over daimant's land to adjoin-
ing airport held a "taking").
"Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 26 Sup. Ct. 127 (1905); Lynn v. United
States, 110 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1940); Mills v. United States, 46 Fed. 738 (S.D.Ga.
1891).
"Unted States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 65 Sup.Ct. 761 (1945).
Contra: United States v. Kelly, 243 U.S. 316, 37 Sup.Ct. 380 (1917) (reported
with Cress case and decided on same principles).
"Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269, 17 Sup. Ct. 578 (1897).
Cubbins v. Mississippi River Commission, 241 U.S. 351, 36 Sup. Ct. 671 (1916);
Bedford v. United States, 192 U.S. 217, 24 Sup.Ct. 238 (1904); Franklin v. United
States, 101 F.2d 459 (6th Cir. 1939), aff'd Per cuaram, 308 U.S. 516, 60 Sup. Ct.
170 (1939); Note, 18 N.C.L. REv. 43 (1939).
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